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This paper takes up the foundational issue of existence of stationary subgame perfect equi-
libria in a general class of coalitional bargaining games that includes many known bargaining
models and models of coalition formation. General suﬃcient conditions for existence of equilib-
ria are currently lacking in many interesting environments: bargaining models with non-concave
stage utility functions, models with a Pareto optimal status quo alternative and heterogeneous
discount factors, and models of coalition formation in public good economies with consumption
lower bounds. This paper establishes existence of stationary equilibrium under compactness
and continuity conditions, without the structure of convexity or comprehensiveness used in the
extant literature. The proof requires a precise selection of voting equilibria following diﬀerent
proposals. The result is applied to obtain equilibria in models of bargaining over taxes, coalition
formation in NTU environments, and collective dynamic programming problems.
1 Introduction
This paper establishes existence of stationary subgame perfect equilibria in a general model that
captures bargaining in economic environments, coalition formation in NTU environments, and col-
lective dynamic programming problems. The framework grows out of the bargaining literature
in economics and political science, originating with the seminal work of Rubinstein (1982). In
economics, a number of papers following Chatterjee, Dutta, Ray, and Sengupta (1993) have inves-
tigated models of coalition formation built on bargaining protocols extending Rubinstein’s, while
in political science, a literature on legislative bargaining building on Baron and Ferejohn (1989)
has emerged. The focus of both strands has been on the characterization of stationary equilibria,
but there are quite natural environments for which the question of existence has been left open:
• legislative bargaining in a one-dimensional policy space (as in Banks and Duggan (2000)) in
which stage utilities are single-peaked but not concave,
• legislative bargaining in which the status quo is a Pareto optimal policy (as in Banks and
Duggan (2006)) and the discount factors of the agents are heterogeneous,
• coalition formation in public good economies where individuals have property rights over
endowments (as in Ray and Vohra (1999)) but consumption is non-negative.
1Three main applications motivate the general existence result. The ﬁrst is a legislature that must
choose taxes that determine the set of equilibrium allocations of an economy. Because the equi-
librium correspondence has closed but not convex graph, extant results do not apply, but in the
framework of this paper taxes can be generated by Markovian equilibrium behavior of legislators in
a dynamic bargaining game. The example extends easily to bargaining over parameters of general
games. The second is coalition formation in an NTU model in which proposers are determined
stochastically, as in Binmore (1987), rather than according to the rejector-becomes-proposer proto-
col that is common in the coalition formation literature. The third is a model of collective dynamic
programming with a countable set of states, in which a state-dependent decision-maker proposes
a collective action, which is then voted on by the agents. As in the standard single-agent model,
current states and actions determine future states, but now the identity of the decision-maker can
change over time, and collective actions require the approval of at least one decisive coalition.
I analyze a general model of coalitional bargaining such that in each period, one agent proposes
an outcome or remains silent, other agents simultaneously respond, and the game then may or
may not continue. Stage games are parameterized by a countable set of states. Outcomes may be
divisions of a pie, choices of policy in a multidimensional space, allocations of private and public
goods in an economcy, or choices of achievable vectors of utilities for coalitions. I assume only
that the set of outcomes is a compact metric space and that the agents have continuous stage
utilities—no convexity conditions are imposed. The process governing the timing of proposals
is also quite general: agents may make alternating or sequential proposals, or the selection of
a proposer may be random, with recognition probabilities possibly changing over time with the
state. And the rule by which proposals are accepted or rejected is quite arbitrary: acceptance may
require the assent of a majority of agents, or, for that matter, each coalition may have authority to
implement proposals from some set of feasible outcomes that depends on the coalition. The latter
assumption captures supermajority voting rules, economic models in which agents have property
rights over their endowments, and more generally TU and NTU environments common in the
literature on coalition formation. These feasible sets may vary over time as a function of the state,
capturing shocks to production technology or endowments. In contrast to much of the literature on
legislative bargaining and coalition formation, where the game ends once an outcome is determined,
meaningful interaction may be ongoing, with equilibrium outcomes determining future states and
outcomes over an inﬁnite horizon. The equilibrium concept is stationary Markov perfect equilibrium
in stage-undominated voting strategies.
A key to existence of coalitional bargaining equilibria is the possibility of mixing on the part
of the agents, an approach taken by Ray and Vohra (1999) and Banks and Duggan (2000, 2006).
Those papers deliver existence results in which proposers may randomize over the coalition proposed
to, and they are quite general in some respects, but they impose suﬃciently strong conditions to
ensure that equilibria can be found in which the agents use pure voting strategies. In Ray and Vohra
(1999), the restriction to pure voting strategies is achieved by the possibility of side payments in
TU games or strict comprehensiveness in NTU games, whereas Banks and Duggan (2000) rely
on concavity of the agents’ stage utilities and the assumption of a bad “status quo,” and Banks
and Duggan (2006) use concavity and a constraint qualiﬁcation on the indiﬀerence contours of the
agents. To obtain a more general existence result for these environments, including simple ﬁnite
examples, the analysis of voting strategies must be more nuanced. The next example uses a ﬁnite
model to illustrate the need for mixed proposal strategies.
2Example 1 Assume there are three agents and three outcomes with utilities as in the table
below. Assume that each period in which the game is played, an agent is randomly drawn (with
probability 1/3) to propose an outcome or simply remain silent. A proposal passes if two agents
accept, in which case the game ends with the proposed outcome and corresponding payoﬀs. If a
1 2 3
x 2 .7 0
y 0 2 .7
z .7 0 2
proposal fails, or the proposer remains silent, then we move
to the next period and the process is repeated. Payoﬀs are
discounted by a common factor δ = .9 each period in which
delay occurs. A stationary equilibrium in pure strategies con-
sists of a proposal for each agent and a response strategy to
each possible proposal. It is not an equilibrium for each agent
to propose her favorite outcome and for that proposal to pass
with probability one: in that case, agent 1 would propose x,
but agent 2’s discounted continuation value would be δv2 = (.9/3)[.7 + 2 + 0] = .81 > .7, which
exceeds the payoﬀ from x. Thus, voting for x is dominated for agents 2 and 3, so it would not
pass. And it is not an equilibrium for each agent to propose her second-favorite outcome and for
that proposal to pass with probability one: in that case, agent 1 would propose z and receive a
payoﬀ of .7, but the payoﬀ from remaining silent is δv1 = .81 > .7, so the agent would not make
a proposal. In the appendix, I show that in every stationary equilibrium, each agent’s discounted
continuation value must be .7, and it can be checked that there is no pure strategy proﬁle that
generates these continuation values. Thus, the conditions for equilibrium lead to mixing, as in
the following: each agent proposes with probability .39 her second-favorite outcome, which passes
with probability one, and with probability .61 she proposes her favorite outcome, which fails with
probability one. There is actually a continuum of stationary equilibria in which agents use pure
voting strategies, for instead of proposing her favorite outcome, an agent could equivalently remain
silent, or she could mix over the two options.  
Concavity assumptions in the standard legislative bargaining framework imply that proposals
are always accepted in equilibrium — delay cannot occur. The next example, a continuation of the
ﬁrst, shows that delay must occur in equilibrium, highlighting the possible role of non-convexities
in the phenomenon of ineﬃcient delay.
Example 1 (cont.) Suppose there is an equilibrium with no delay, so no agent remains silent and
every proposal made in equilibrium passes with probability one. We have already observed that
it is not the case that for every agent, if the agent proposes her favorite outcome, then it passes
with probability one. So assume that if agent 1 proposes x, then agent 2 rejects x with positive
probability. Then it must be that agent 1 proposes z with probability one, and this passes. But
then δv3 ≥ (.3)[2 + 0 + .7] > .7, contradicting the result, shown in the appendix, that δv3 = .7 in
equilibrium. Therefore, all equilibria produce delay with positive probability.  
For ﬁnite environments, existence of stationary equilibria in mixed proposal and voting strategies
follows from a standard result on existence of mixed strategy equilibria in ﬁnite stochastic games.1
Although the agents use pure voting strategies in the equilibrium of Example 1, the existence result
for ﬁnite stochastic games does not rule out the possibility of mixed voting strategies. To see that
mixed voting strategies are indeed needed for existence in the coalitional bargaining framework, I
1Technically, we model voting as simultaneous and eliminate stage-dominated voting strategies. But we can
equivalently model voting as sequential and apply the existence result of Rogers (1969) and Sobel (1971).
3reconsider the running example.
Example 2 Modify Example 1 by assuming agent 1 is recognized to propose with probability
.8 and agent 2 is recognized with probability .2.2 I claim it cannot be the case that when agent 1
proposes x, it fails with probability one. Indeed, suppose it did. Then agent 2 rejects x, so δv2 ≥ .7.
If agent 1 proposes x with positive probability in equilibrium, then the agent’s payoﬀ from proposing
is δv1, and since the agent could propose z and receive a payoﬀ of .7, we have δv1 ≥ .7. Therefore,
agent 2 must propose x with positive probability, but then agent 2’s expected payoﬀ from proposing
is .7, so δv2 ≤ (.9)[(.8)δv2+(.2)(.7)], which implies δv2 < .7, a contradiction. Likewise, agent 1 does
not remain silent, and we conclude that the agent proposes z with probability one, and therefore
δv2 < .7, a contradiction that proves the claim. Next, I claim that it cannot be the case that when
agent 1 proposes x, it passes with probability one. Suppose it did. Then agent 1 will propose x,
and since agent 2 accepts it, δv2 ≤ .7. Then δv3 ≤ (.9)[(.8)(0)+(.2)(2)] < .7. It follows that agent 3
will accept y when proposed, so agent 2 will propose y. But then δv2 ≥ (.9)[(.8)(.7) +(.2)(2)] > .7,
a contradiction.  
Mixed voting strategies must therefore be used to obtain equilibrium existence in any class of
environments containing these simple ﬁnite examples. The approach of this paper exploits the
special structure of the coalitional bargaining model to select mixed strategy voting equilibria
following diﬀerent proposals precisely so as to maintain the proposers’ optimality conditions. A
key to this approach is that because agents who are indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting a
proposal can mix arbitrarily, the set of voting equilibria is convex. Because voting strategies are
conditioned on proposals, which take values in a compact metric space, this problem is potentially
inﬁnite-dimensional and leads to the question of a suitable topology on the space of voting strate-
gies. I circumvent this diﬃculty by applying a version of Fatou’s lemma to reduce the problem
to a ﬁnite-dimensional one,3 submerging voting strategies in the construction of the ﬁxed point
correspondence. It is worth noting that existence of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium in the
general model does not follow from the extant game-theoretic literature. Work by Harris (1985a,b),
B¨ orgers (1989,1991), and Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) establishes existence of subgame perfect
equilibria in perfect information games and of correlated subgame perfect equilibria in games of
“almost perfect” information,4 and in fact these results apply to the coalitional bargaining model,
but their results do not yield stationarity. The literature on stochastic games focuses on stationar-
ity, and the coalitional bargaining model can indeed be formulated as a stochastic game, but fully
stationary subgame perfect equilibria are not established for general games,5 and that literature
relies on a critical continuity condition on the transition probability of the game that is violated
in the bargaining model: the issue is that the outcome chosen by the proposer is directly voted
on by the agents, unmediated by any random noise; this deterministic transition probability from
proposal subgames to voting subgames is discontinuous with respect to the strong topology used
in the literature.
2The example is robust, in the sense that agent 1 could we well propose with small probability.
3Or, if the set of states is countably inﬁnite, to a problem of countable dimensionality.
4See also Fudenberg and Levine (1983), Hellwig and Leininger (1987), and Hellwig, Leininger, Reny, and Robson
(1990).
5For example, correlation is used (Nowak and Raghavan (1992)), or stationarity is relaxed (Chakrabarti (1999)),
or ǫ-best responses are allowed (Nowak (1985)).
4The model of this paper covers the literature on legislative bargaining, including the distribu-
tive model of Baron and Ferejohn (1989), the unanimity bargaining model with stochastic pie of
Merlo and Wilson (1995) and Eraslan and Merlo’s (2002) majority-rule version, the one-dimensional
model of Jackson and Moselle (2002), the general spatial models of Banks and Duggan (2000,2006),
and Kalandrakis’s (2004a) version with proposer selection following an arbitrary Markov chain. On
the coalition formation side, it generalizes Okada’s (1996) TU model with random proposers to
the NTU setting, and it extends the NTU model of Herings and Predtetchinski (2009) to arbitrary
voting rules. Much of the literature on coalitions formation, such as Chatterjee, Dutta, Ray, and
Sengupta (1993), Bloch (1996), Krishna and Serrano (1996), and Ray and Vohra (1999) assume
that the identity of next period’s proposer is endogenous — it is the ﬁrst agent, if any, to re-
ject the current proposal — that takes it outside the framework of this paper.6 Ray and Vohra
(1999) prove existence of equilibrium with this protocol for NTU games satisfying strict compre-
hensiveness, a weak assumption in private good economies but one that is easily violated in public
good environments with consumption lower bounds.7 In the absence of strict comprehensiveness,
however, existence is problematic, and the technique of selecting voting equilibria cannot be used
because we may lose the key property of convexity of voting equilibrium outcomes: an example in
the concluding section illustrates how the set of equilibrium outcomes in a voting subgame can be
non-convex in that model, undermining the ﬁxed point argument used in this paper and pointing
to a potentially deep problem of equilibrium existence. Nevertheless, I conjecture that existence is
regained if public randomization is allowed before agents respond to proposals.
In the remainder of the paper, Section 2 presents the general coalitional bargaining model, and
Section 3 considers a number of special cases to illustrate its ﬂexibility. I describe how to obtain
ﬁnite environments with a moving status quo, the legislative bargaining model of Baron and Fer-
ejohn (1989) and its successors, and in particular an application to bargaining over taxes in an
economy or parameters of a more general game, a generalization of Okada’s (1996) TU coalition
formation model to the NTU case, along with a version of the model with coalitional externalities
and incomplete contracts, and ﬁnally a model of collective dynamic programming in which agents
vote on collective choices that inﬂuence the evolution of the state. Section 4 contains the formal
statement and proof of the existence theorem, Section 5 gives an overview of the proof approach,
and Section 6 concludes. Statement and proof of auxiliary results are contained in the appendix.
2 Coalitional Bargaining Framework
The model is given by the list (N,S,X,{XC}C⊆N,{ui}i∈N,q,p,{δi}i∈N), where N is a ﬁnite set
of n agents, S is a countable set of states with the discrete topology, X is a compact metric space
of outcomes, XC : S ⇉ X speciﬁes for each coalition C and state s a closed set XC(s) consisting
of outcomes feasible for coalition C in state s, ui: X × S → ℜ is a bounded and continuous stage
payoﬀ function for agent i, q is a ﬁxed default outcome belonging to X, p: S × X × S → [0,1]
6See Serrano (2005), Bandyopadhyay and Chatterjee (2006), and Ray (2007) for recent surveys of this literature.
7Suppose there are two agents, one public good, and one private good. Consider the Pareto optimal allocation
in which one agent is given all of the private good, and she chooses her optimal level of public good production. If
that level is positive, then the utility to the second agent could easily exceed the utility from his endowment, but we
cannot reduce his utility in a way that beneﬁts the ﬁrst agent. In other words, the Pareto frontier of the set of utility
imputations has a “ﬂat” portion.
5is a continuous state transition probability function, and δi: S × S → [0,1] speciﬁes the discount
factor δi(s,s′) for agent i that gives the weight of tomorrow’s payoﬀs relative to today’s when we
transition from state s to state s′. The coalitional bargaining game among the agents is governed
by the following protocol: 1) each period t begins with a state s; 2) an agent i(s) determined by
the state proposes any outcome x in X; 3) the agents simultaneously decide whether to accept or
reject this proposal; 4) if there is a coalition C ⊆ N such that x ∈ XC(s) and all members of C
accept x, then x is the outcome in period t, and payoﬀs ui(x,s) accrue to the agents; otherwise,
the agents receive payoﬀs ui(q,s) from the default outcome q ∈ X; ﬁnally, 5) the game transitions
to period t + 1, a new state s′ is drawn with probability p(s′|x,s), and the protocol is repeated
with the following period’s payoﬀs discounted by δi(s,s′). Thus, given sequences s = (st)∞
t=1 and
x = (xt)∞








and the discounted sum of payoﬀs is




Since each ui is bounded below, I normalize stage payoﬀs so that mini,s,x ui(s,x) ≥ 0 without loss
of generality.
Assume that the sets of feasible outcomes are closed, and therefore compact, and that they are
monotonic. That is, for states s and all coalitions C and C′ with C ⊆ C′, we have XC(s) ⊆ XC′(s).
Assume also that the status quo q is an isolated point, i.e., {q} is open in X, and that q is always
feasible for all coalitions, i.e., q ∈ XC(s) for all s and all C, so that a proposer always has the option
to “pass” and obtain the default for the current period. The assumption that the default is isolated
is without loss of generality. Given a model in which q ∈ X is not isolated, we can modify the model
by appending an artiﬁcial element q′ to X to obtain a new set X′ = X∪{q′} of outcomes, extending
the metric on X so that q′ is isolated in X′, and extending utilities and the transition probability
so that u′
i(q′,s) = ui(q,s) and p′(s′|q′,j,s) = p(s′|q,j,s). Thus, the re-deﬁned default q′ enters in
these functions exactly as the previous default and fulﬁlls our assumptions without aﬀecting the
strategic structure of the game. The former default is still an element of X′ and replicates q′ and
is not isolated, but the existence of such an outcome is compatible with the other assumptions.
Discount factors are speciﬁed quite generally, allowing them to depend on the states from
which, and to which, the game transitions. This is helpful in capturing environments where the
time between some decisions is inconsequential, so no discounting occurs. So that dynamic payoﬀs








where the supremum is over sequences (x1,...,xT−1) ∈ XT−1 and (s1,...,sT) ∈ ST such that  T−1
t=1 p(st+1|xt,st) > 0. To parse this condition, note that if each discount factor δi(s,s′) were
6equal to one, then the lefthand side would equal the righthand side. Clearly, this is ruled out. The
inequality says that over any span of T periods with positive probability, regardless of the states
and outcomes determined over that span, payoﬀs are discounted at some point along that sequence.
Furthermore, deﬁne δ = max{δi(s,s′) | i ∈ N,s,s′ ∈ S,δi(s,s′) < 1}, and assume δ < 1. Thus,
there may be transitions that are essentially instantaneous, but there do not exist transitions that
are arbitrarily close to instantaneous; this is automatically satisﬁed if S is ﬁnite. Obviously, the
discounting assumption is satisﬁed if each agent i discounts payoﬀs over time according to a ﬁxed
discount factor δi ∈ [0,1).
To deﬁne proposal strategies for an agent i, let Si be the subset of s ∈ S such that i =
i(s), and let P(X) be the space of Borel probability measures on X endowed with the weak*
topology. A stationary proposal strategy for agent i is a measurable mapping πi: Si → P(X),
where πi(s)(Y ) denotes the probability that i proposes an outcome in the Borel measurable set Y
in state s. A stationary voting strategy is a Borel measurable mapping αi: X × S → [0,1], where
αi(x,s) is the probability that i votes to accept proposal x in state s. A stationary strategy is
then a pair σi = (πi,αi). Let σ = (σ1,...,σn) denote a stationary strategy proﬁle. Note one
departure from stationarity as deﬁned in Banks and Duggan (2000,2006), Ray and Vohra (1999),
and others: because the state contains the identity of the proposer, I allow voting strategies αj(x,s)
to implicitly depend on the proposer. This is innocuous when, as in previous work, voting equilibria
are essentially unique and in pure strategies. In the current framework, however, the selection of
mixed strategy voting equilibria when some agents are indiﬀerent can depend on the proposer.
Given a proﬁle σ of stationary strategies, we can calculate the expected discounted sum of
payoﬀs for agent i when state s obtains at the beginning of a period. These continuation values,


























   
j∈C
αj(x,s)





Note that by the assumption that the proposer can impose the default, α(x,s) = 1 if x = q and
the proposer votes to accept. Given σ, deﬁne the agent’s dynamic payoﬀ from outcome x in state
s as




incorporating not only the current stage payoﬀ but expected future payoﬀs as well. Note that
dynamic payoﬀs are continuous in (x,s).
A coalitional bargaining equilibrium is a stationary strategy proﬁle σ such that agents propose
optimally given the voting strategies of others and such that agents use stage-undominated voting
7strategies following proposals. Formally, the requirement on proposal strategies is that for all i and
all s ∈ Si, πi(s) put probability one on solutions to
max
x∈X(s)
α(x,s)Ui(x,s;σ) + (1 − α(x,s))Ui(q,s;σ),
and, using the assumption that the feasible sets XC(s) are monotonic, the requirement on voting
strategies is that for all i and all s,
αi(x,s) =
 
1 if Ui(x,s;σ) > Ui(q,s;σ)
0 if Ui(x,s;σ) < Ui(q,s;σ),
with no restriction on votes when agents are indiﬀerent, i.e., Ui(x,s;σ) = Ui(q,s;σ). The implicit
requirement of stage undominated voting strategies is standard and used to preclude Nash equilibria
of the voting game in which, for example, all agents vote reject and none are pivotal (so rejection
is trivially a best response). This reﬁnement could be dropped if, instead, I speciﬁed that voting
were sequential, a common approach that does not aﬀect the set of equilibrium outcomes.
3 Special Cases
The model set forth in the previous section has been described in a parsimonious way. Rather than
explicitly building in complex structure, we capture special cases of interest by exploiting hidden
generality of the model. This section shows how perhaps unexpected structure can be obtained by
suitable speciﬁcation of the coalitional bargaining model.
3.1 Finite Environments with Moving Status Quo
It is well-known that stationary subgame perfect equilibria exist in ﬁnite stochastic games, and that
result applies (with minor adjustments) to the current framework. Thus, the contribution of this
paper is equilibrium existence in dynamic coalitional games with inﬁnite sets of feasible outcomes.
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the approach to existence taken here applies equally well to
ﬁnite versions of the model. For example, let P denote a ﬁnite set of “positions,” let X = P ∪ {q}
be the set of positions augmented by an abstract default outcome q, and let the set of states be
S = N × P, where a state s = (i,x) speciﬁes the proposer in the current period and the current
position. Given s = (i,x), the set XC(s) represents the set of positions to which coalition C has
authority to move from x, and given outcome z, stage utilities are deﬁned by
ui(z,(j,x)) =
 
ri(z) if z ∈ X \ {q},
ri(x) if z = q,
where ri: X → ℜ is arbitrary. Given outcome z in state (i,x), transition probabilities are such that
if z ∈ X \{q}, then the current position moves to x, and the next proposer is selected according to
a time-invariant probability distribution on the set of agents. That is, state (j,z) is selected with
probability pj, where
 
pk = 1. And if the proposer chooses the default or makes an unsuccessful
proposal, then the current position stays at x, and a new proposer is again randomly drawn, so
8(j,x) is selected with probability pj. Thus, the state (i,x) keeps track of the status quo position,
x, and if the members of an authorized coalition accept a new position, then it becomes part of
the status quo in the next period; otherwise, x is maintained. Note that the technical role of the
default q is to modulate stage utilities and transition probabilities — it does not produce utility,
but it controls when utility is derived from the current status quo.




X if |C| > n
2,
{q} else,
we obtain a ﬁnite version of the endogenous status quo bargaining models of Baron (1996) and
Kalandrakis (2004b,2009). Or, assuming XC(s) is independent of the proposer i, the primitives
of this model are as in Konishi and Ray (2003). Although their analysis is cooperative, as they
analyze the properties of a class of Markov chains consistent with coalitional incentives of farsighted
agents, a coalitional bargaining equilibrium essentially generates a process of coalition formation
(PCF) in the sense of those authors.8 Finally, given a state (i,x) and a failed proposal, we can
specify that the next proposer is an agent who has not previously proposed and that the transition
is not discounted until either a proposal passes or there are no remaining unused agents, giving us
an agenda-setting protocol as in Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2009).
3.2 General Legislative Bargaining
The legislative bargaining model of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) is subsumed by specifying the set
of states as S = N ∪ {τ}, where i ∈ S indicates the proposer in a given period and τ ∈ S is a
terminal state. Let X = ∆ ∪ {q}, where ∆ is the unit simplex in ℜn, with x ∈ ∆ representing an
allocation of a “dollar” among the n agents. Again specify majority voting. Stage utilities from
outcome x ∈ X in state s are speciﬁed as
ui(x,s) =
  xi
1−δ if x ∈ ∆ and s ∈ N
0 else,







x = q x ∈ ∆
Transition probabilities are speciﬁed so
that the terminal state τ is absorbing. In
state i ∈ S, if x ∈ X \ {q} is proposed
and receives the support of a majority of
agents, then payoﬀs are accrued as spec-
iﬁed above, and the game transitions to
the terminal state, and the agents receive
zero payoﬀs thereafter. If no allocation is
8There is a slight wedge between their equilibrium concept and the one I use, as the non-cooperative analysis
allows for the possibility of delay, even if there is some coalition that strictly prefers to move to a diﬀerent outcome
that is feasible for the coalition.
9passed in the current period, then the agents receive the default payoﬀ of zero, and the state transi-
tions to j ∈ N with probability pj, where
 
pj = 1. The transition probability p(s′|z,i) is depicted
above.
The coalitional bargaining model also captures the more general versions of the Baron-Ferejohn
model as analyzed in Banks and Duggan (2000,2006). In the earlier of those papers, the latter
authors assume a set A of alternatives that is a compact, convex subset of ﬁnite-dimensional Eu-
clidean space, generalizing the unit simplex, and they assume stage utilities ui(a) are continuous,
concave, and positive on A, whereas the default payoﬀ is zero. The voting rule is given by an
arbitrary nonempty collection D of decisive coalitions that is monotonic in the sense that C ∈ D
and C ⊆ C′ implies C′ ∈ D. Discount factors may diﬀer across agents. We capture this model
by appending an abstract default q to the set A of alternatives to obtain the set X = A ∪ {q} of
outcomes, and we extend stage utilities so that ui(x,j) = ui(x)/(1 − δi) and ui(x,τ) = 0 for x ∈ A
and ui(q,j) = ui(q,τ) = 0. In the later paper, the authors allow for default payoﬀs to be given by
an arbitrary alternative, say aq ∈ A, and they assume a common discount factor and a constraint
qualiﬁcation on the indiﬀerence contours of the agents that generalizes the customary condition
of strict quasi-concavity. Then we specify the default payoﬀ as ui(q,j) = ui(aq). Those papers
establish existence of stationary bargaining equilibria in which agents use pure voting strategies,
and those results can be obtained as special cases of the main theorem of this paper.9 The con-
vexity conditions employed by Banks and Duggan (2000,2006) are necessitated by the focus on
pure voting strategies. The more general setting of the current paper captures models in which
those assumptions are violated and for which no results on existence of stationary equilibria are
currently known. For example, in some applications it is natural to assume single-peakedness (or
quasi-concavity more generally), whereas cardinal restrictions such as concavity are less convincing.
Moreover, in applications where payoﬀs are given by an alternative that is not worse than every
other conceivable alternative for every agent (which likely covers a great portion of situations of
interest), there may be no reason to assume agents discount future payoﬀs at the same rate, and
so we would like to allow for heterogeneous discount factors.
Now consider legislative bargaining among a group of legislators who must choose a tax system
t ∈ T, a compact metric space, which then determines a set of equilibrium allocations E(t) ⊆ ℜkm in
an economy with m consumers (which may or may not include the legislators) and k commodities.
Assume that the range of E is compact and that the correspondence has nonempty values and







1−δi if x = (t,a) ∈ graph(E) and s ∈ N
ui(tq,aq,s) if x = q and s ∈ N
0 if s = τ,
where tq is the status quo tax system and aq ∈ E(tq) the status quo equilibrium allocation, and
ui(t,a,s) is jointly continuous in its arguments. The voting rule is given by an arbitrary collec-
tion D of decisive coalitions. Note that a proposal consists of not only a tax system t, but also
an equilibrium allocation a ∈ E(t) consistent with the tax system, allowing the proposer to re-
solve indeterminacy of economic equilibria arbitrarily. We could for the most part suppress the
9With the observation that in the framework of Banks and Duggan (2000,2006), all proposals weakly acceptable
to all members of a decisive coalition must pass in equilibrium.
10announcement of the equilibrium allocation, instead relying on an appropriate selection of equilib-
rium allocations following tax systems proposed by a given agent. A conceptual subtlety arises,
however, if a proposer mixes over two outcomes (t,a) and (t,a′) with the same tax system, for then
consumers must observe the legislator’s announcement of the allocation (or some other sunspot) to
select equilibria with the correct probabilities.
Because the correspondence has compact graph, the assumptions of the model are fulﬁlled
here, and therefore a coalitional bargaining equilibrium exists. This example can be extended
to any situation in which a group of agents bargains over parameters of a game, as long as the
parameter space is compact metric and the equilibrium correspondence has nonempty values and
compact graph. In fact, the main theorem of this paper establishes that the correspondence of
coalitional bargaining equilibrium continuation value vectors has closed graph, so we can obtain
existence of equilibrium in an issue-by-issue version of the model. Suppose for example that the
set of outcomes is the square X = [0,1]d and that the dimensions must be decided on in order.
Speciﬁcally, a committee Ch ⊆ N with jurisdiction on dimension h bargains over the coordinate
xh given previous decisions x1,...,xh−1 on other coordinates. Then the bargaining game among
members of committee Cd given x1,...,xd−1 is a one-dimensional version of the Baron-Ferejohn
model parameterized by (x1,...,xd−1). The correspondence Ed: [0,1]d−1 ⇉ ℜn of coalitional
bargaining equilibrium continuation values has nonempty values and compact graph, and therefore
the bargaining game in committee Cd−1 admits equilibria for each (x1,...,xd−2), and the set of
equilibrium payoﬀ vectors of this game has nonempty values and compact graph, with each vector
(v1,...,vn) ∈ E(x1,...,xd−2) of continuation values predicated on a selection of equilibria for the
bargaining game in Cd, and so on. Finally, the bargaining game for the ﬁrst committee C1 admits
an equilibrium, which embeds equilibrium selections in all later subgames.
3.3 Coalition Formation in NTU Environments
Okada (1996) generalizes the legislative bargaining model of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) by con-
sidering an abstract coalitional bargaining environment with transferable utility. Let v be a TU
coalition function such that v({i}) = 0, v(C ∪ C′) ≥ v(C) + v(C′) for disjoint coalitions, and










as the payoﬀ vectors feasible for C. In any period, some pairwise disjoint collection C of coalitions
has formed, and the agents A = N \
 
C remain active. An agent i is drawn from the set of
active agents with probability pA
i and makes a proposal (C,x) such that x ∈ V (C). The members
of C vote to accept or reject the proposal, and if all members accept, then each i ∈ C receives
stage payoﬀ xi/(1 − δ), and each i / ∈ C receives a stage payoﬀ of zero. The game moves to the
next period, with the collection C′ = C ∪ {C} of formed coalitions and continues until no active
players remain, at which point the game ends. Stage utilities are discounted by the common factor
δ ∈ [0,1) after each period. Okada (1996) analyzes pure strategy stationary equilibria of this game
and characterizes when such equilibria exist, but pure strategy equilibria sometimes fail to exist in
this setting.
11This model is obtained as a special case of the coalitional bargaining model by deﬁning S to
consist of all pairs (i,C), where i represents the proposer for the current period and C is a pairwise
disjoint collection of coalitions representing the coalitions that have formed, along with a terminal
state τ. Deﬁne X = {q}∪
 
{V (C) | C ⊆ N}, where q is an abstract default outcome, and for each
C and (i,C), deﬁne
XC(i,C) =
 




Deﬁne stage utilities from outcome x in state s as
ui(x,s) =
  xi
1−δ if i ∈ C and x ∈ V (C) and s  = τ,
0 else.
Transition probabilities are speciﬁed so that the terminal state τ is absorbing. In state s = (i,C), if
x ∈ XC(s) is proposed and is accepted by all members of C, and if there exists j ∈ A′ = N\(C∪
 
C),
then the game transitions to state (j,C ∪ {C}) with probability pA′
j ; in case there exists no such
agent j, then the game transitions to the terminal state. If no allocation is passed in the current
period, then agents receive the default payoﬀ of zero, and the state transitions to (j,C), where
j ∈ A = N\
 
C is selected as proposer with probability pA








x ∈ XC(s) (j,C ∪ {C})
(k,C ∪ {C})
A′ = ∅
A′  = ∅
t
An implication of the main theorem of the current paper is that when agents are permitted to
mix, a coalitional bargaining equilibrium indeed exists. In fact, the result applies in considerably
more general environments: it is suﬃcient that feasible outcomes are given by an NTU coalition
function V such that V (C) ⊆ ℜ|C| is nonempty and compact for each coalition C and such that
V ({i}) = {0} for each agent i. This captures, for example, coalitional bargaining in private good
exchange economies, but is also encompasses environments in which strict comprehensiveness is
violated, including public good economies with consumption lower bounds. Ray and Vohra (1999)
prove existence in general TU settings, and they extend the result to NTU environments satisfying
strict comprehensiveness in the discussion following the proof of their Theorem 2.1. Their proof
approach is predicated on the rejector-becomes-proposer protocol, however, so a contribution of
the existence result here is to allow for stochastically determined proposers, or rotating protocols,
or more general models in which the next proposer is determined as a function of the current state.
Moreover, Ray and Vohra’s proof strategy requires strict comprehensiveness, which is unavailable in
some economic environments of interest. Herings and Predtetchinski (2009) prove existence of pure
strategy stationary equilibria in NTU environments satisfying (not necessarily strict) comprehen-
siveness, although they assume voting is by unanimity rule. Thus, the result of the current paper
12shows that existence (in mixed strategies) is maintained for arbitrary voting rules, even without
comprehensiveness.
Ray and Vohra (1999) actually consider a model that is built on a partitional coalition function,
which allows limited externalities between coalitions, and in this respect is more general than the
coalitional bargaining model. In the TU context, given a coalition C and a partition C of N \ C,
the value of C is written v(C;C), so the value of the coalition can depend on which other coalitions
form (though not the allocations selected by the other coalitions), and when a proposer oﬀers
an allocation to the coalition C, it must be contingent on the collection of other coalitions that
subsequently form. In eﬀect, an agent proposes a menu of allocations, one for each possible partition
C. The approach of the current paper does not directly extend to partition function environments
such as this, because it requires that the payoﬀs of the agents at the end of the game depend on
proposals (menus) accepted in earlier periods. This is only possible in the coalitional bargaining
framework if coalitional agreements in early periods are encoded in the state variable, but because
the set of states is countable, they cannot generally be used to carry forward past agreements, which
may vary over a continuous space, to the end of the game. The problem is that in this version of
the partition function model, coalitions are able to write complex contracts that are contingent on
future coalitions that form.
We can, however, capture a model of externalities in which coalitions cannot write binding
contracts that commit them in advance to contingent allocations. To do so, assume an initial phase
of coalition formation, in which a randomly drawn agent proposes to a set of agents that they form
a coalition—without specifying an allocation of payoﬀs. Then, the latter agents respond, and so on,
and this process continues until all agents have selected into groups (possibly singletons). The oﬀer
to form a coalition can also include a voting rule, or “constitution,” used to choose an allocation
in the second phase, as long as the set of possible constitutions is ﬁnite. In the second phase,
the formed coalitions sequentially allocate payoﬀs from their feasible sets among their members;
because agents have already selected into coalitions, these allocations will depend in equilibrium
on the coalitions that have formed. Because the set of possible coalition structures is ﬁnite, we
can encode the outcomes of the ﬁrst phase in the state variable. Say at the end of the formation
phase, the state is s = {C1,...,Cm}. Then the members of coalition C1 choose an allocation
x1 ∈ V (C;s), and the state transitions to s′ = {C1,...,Cm} × {C1}, where the second component
records the coalitions that have agreed upon allocations, then coalition C2 chooses an allocation,
and so on, until all coalitions have chosen allocations and the game ends. In this way, we can
capture environments characterized by coalitional externalities and incomplete contracts.
3.4 Collective Dynamic Programming
The coalitional bargaining framework extends well beyond the previous examples. In the legislative
bargaining and coalition formation environments, there is a terminal state that is reached when,
respectively, a majority ﬁrst accepts a proposal or all coalitions have formed. We can also extend
the standard dynamic programming framework with a ﬁnite state space S and compact metric
space A of actions, where A(s) is the set of actions feasible in state s, to allow for collective choice.
Now, instead of a single decision maker, we assume a ﬁnite set of agents and interpret actions
a ∈ A as collective actions, such as allocations of goods for current consumption and a level of
13public investment. Assume each agent i has continuous stage utility ui(a,s) deﬁned on action-state
pairs, and let p(s′|a,s) denote the transition probability function. It may be that each state s
determines a unique decision maker i(s) who chooses any feasible action a ∈ A(s), but we can allow
for majority voting or more complex voting rules. Letting D(s) denote the monotonic collection of
decisive coalitions in state s, we assume that i proposes an action a ∈ A(s) and the agents then vote
to either accept the proposal a or reject it in favor of an exogenously speciﬁed default d(s) ∈ A(s).
In the public investment example, this could simply be that the agents consume their endowments
and invest nothing. If the members of a decisive coalition accept a, then the agents accrue stage
utility ui(a,s), discounted by δt−1
i in period t, and the game moves to the next period with state s′
drawn from p( |a,s); otherwise, payoﬀs are ui(d(s),s) and the transition probability is p( |d(s),s).
We obtain the collective dynamic programming model as a special case of the coalitional bar-
gaining framework in a straightforward way, appending an abstract default outcome q to A and
specifying the feasible outcomes XC(s) for coalition C as the set A(s) ∪ {q} if C ∈ D(s) and as
{q} otherwise. We extend stage utilities and the transition probability so that q plays the same
role as the default d(s) in each state, i.e., ui(q,s) = ui(d(s),s) and p(s′|q,s) = p(s′|d(s),s). This
model deviates from the standard framework in two ways. In the standard framework, the decision
maker chooses an action in state s knowing that she chooses optimally in every subsequent pe-
riod, giving rise to the well-known Bellman equation. But in the collective dynamic programming
model, decision maker i must anticipate that future choices may be determined by other agents,
a distortion that can aﬀect the current decision by agent i. This wedge is present even in the
model where the decision making agent i(s) may unilaterally choose any collective action a ∈ A(s).
When i’s proposal is subject to approval by a decisive coalition, there is a second wedge between
the collective framework and the standard one due to “political constraints.” In eﬀect, agent i’s
problem is to choose a optimally subject to political constraints, which are endogenous, as well as
the usual feasibility constraints.
4 Existence of Coalitional Bargaining Equilibria
For the statement of the following theorem, parameterize stage payoﬀ functions and the transition
probability on states by the elements γ of a metric space Γ, as in ui(x,s,γ) and p(s′|x,s,γ), and
assume ui and p are jointly continuous in their arguments. In this section, vi,s will denote agent i’s
continuation value calculated at the beginning of a period in state s, and v = (vi,s)i∈N,s∈S ∈ ℜN×S
a vector of continuation values. It is understood that ℜN×S, and other explicitly deﬁned product
spaces, are endowed with the product topology. Deﬁne the correspondence E: Γ ⇉ ℜN×S such
that E(γ) consists of vectors v such that in the model parameterized by γ, there exists a coalitional
bargaining equilibrium σ = (π,α) with continuation values v = (vi(s;σ))i∈N,s∈S. The next result
establishes existence of coalitional bargaining equilibria, along with upper hemicontinuity of the
correspondence of equilibrium continuation values.
Theorem 4.1 The correspondence E: Γ ⇉ ℜN×S has non-empty, closed values and is upper hemi-
continuous.
14The rest of this section consists of the existence proof; see the next section for an in-depth
discussion of the approach. We will use ws to denote the expected discounted payoﬀ of the proposer







so that we can assume vi,s,ws ∈ [0,u] for all i and s. I use the notation π = (πs)s∈S ∈ P(X)S for
a proﬁle of mixed proposal strategies. Let X(s) =
 
C⊆N XC(s) be the feasible outcomes in state
s, and deﬁne the nonempty, convex, compact product space
Θ =











with elements θ = (π,w,v). Finally, let Θ+ = Θ × Γ be this space augmented by the parameters
of the model. Denote a generic element of Θ+ by θ+ = (π,w,v,γ).
I will deﬁne a correspondence F : Θ+ ⇉ Θ such that for all γ ∈ Γ, F( ,γ) has a ﬁxed point θ∗ =
(π∗,w∗,v∗) ∈ F(θ∗,γ); each ﬁxed point θ∗ corresponds to a coalitional bargaining equilibrium in
the model parameterized by γ; and the correspondence of ﬁxed points has closed graph. Write F as
a product correspondence F = P ×W ×V . For the construction of the component correspondences,
it will be useful to deﬁne an analogue of dynamic payoﬀs as




for all i and s. This simulates an agent’s dynamic payoﬀ under the assumption that v represents
future payoﬀs and is continuous in its arguments.
I ﬁrst deﬁne P. For each state s and agent i, deﬁne the correspondences Ai(s, ),A◦
i(s, ): Θ+ ⇉
X(s) by
Ai(s,θ+) = {x ∈ X(s) | Ui(x,s,θ+) ≥ Ui(q,s,θ+)}
A◦
i(s,θ+) = {x ∈ X(s) | Ui(x,s,θ+) > Ui(q,s,θ+)},
and for each coalition C, deﬁne AC(s, ),A◦
C(s, ): Θ+ ⇉ X(s) by




















and note that q ∈ A(s,θ+). Intuitively, if continuation values are given by θ+, then A◦(s,θ+)
consists of the outcomes that would necessarily pass if proposed in equilibrium, and A(s,θ+) consists
15of the outcomes that could possibly pass in s if proposed in equilibrium. Endowing X(s) with the
relative topology induced by X, continuity of Ui implies that for all s ∈ S, A(s, ) has closed graph,
A◦(s, ) has open graph, and for all θ+, closA◦(s,θ+) ⊆ A(s,θ+). Furthermore, because XC(s) is
closed (and therefore compact), A(s, ) is actually upper hemi-continuous.
To deﬁne P, for each s, let ˆ u(s, ): Θ+ → ℜ be the mapping deﬁned by
ˆ u(s,θ+) = sup{Ui(s)(x,s,θ+) | x ∈ A◦(s,θ+)},
where sup∅ = −∞. Intuitively, this is the payoﬀ that the proposer in state s can guarantee in
equilibrium by proposing outcomes strictly acceptable to some coalition. Note that if ˆ u(s,θ+) >
−∞, then by compactness of the closure of A◦(s,θ+) and continuity of Ui, there exists x ∈ A(s,θ+)
such that Ui(s)(x,s,θ+) = ˆ u(s,θ+). Furthermore, since A◦(s, ) has open graph, it is lower hemi-
continuous, and Aliprantis and Border’s (2006) Lemma 17.29 then implies that ˆ u(s, ) is lower
semi-continuous. Since the proposer can always impose the default, deﬁne the “security value”
f(s,θ+) = max{ˆ u(s,θ+),Ui(s)(q,s,θ+)}.
As each Ui is continuous, and as the pointwise maximum of two lower semi-continuous functions is
lower semi-continuous, we see that f(s, ) is lower semi-continuous; and since S is countable with
the discrete topology, it follows that f is jointly lower semi-continuous in (s,θ+). Deﬁne
ˆ P(s,θ+) = {x ∈ A(s,θ+) | Ui(s)(x,s,θ+) ≥ f(s,θ+)}.
This set is non-empty. Indeed, if ˆ u(s,θ+) ≥ Ui(s)(q,s,θ+), then x ∈ ˆ P(s,θ+), where x is described
above. Otherwise, set q ∈ ˆ P(s,θ+). Furthermore, by continuity of Ui and lower semi-continuity of
f, ˆ P has closed graph. Then deﬁne ˆ P : S × Θ+ ⇉ P(X) by
P(s,θ+) = P( ˆ P(s,θ+)).
By Aliprantis and Border’s (2006) Theorem 17.13, this correspondence has non-empty, convex
values and has closed graph.
To deﬁne W, let supp(πi(s)) denote the support of πi(s), i.e., the smallest closed set Y such
that πi(s)(Y ) = 1, and note that the correspondence supp: P(X) ⇉ X is lower hemi-continuous.
(See Aliprantis and Border’s (2006) Theorem 17.14.) Now deﬁne g: S × Θ+ → ℜ by
g(s,θ+) = min{Ui(s)(s,x,θ+) | x ∈ supp(πs)},
which is well-deﬁned by compactness of X and continuity of Ui(s). By Aliprantis and Border’s (2006)
Lemma 17.14, g is upper semi-continuous. Deﬁne the (possibly empty-valued) correspondence
ˆ W : S × Θ+ ⇉ [0,u] by
ˆ W(s,θ+) = [f(s,θ+),g(s,θ+)].
Clearly, ˆ W is convex-valued. By Lemma A.1, this correspondence has closed, in fact, compact
graph. Since projections of compact sets are compact, the set
ˆ Θ = {(s,θ+) ∈ S × Θ+ | f(s,θ+) ≤ g(s,θ+)}
16is compact. To see that ˆ Θ  = ∅, choose any θ+ = (π,w,v,γ) such that πs puts probability one on
a payoﬀ maximizing outcome in X(s) for the proposer i(s) in model γ. Thus, by Lemma A.3, we
can extend ˆ W from ˆ Θ to a correspondence W : S ×Θ+ ⇉ [0,u] that has non-empty, convex values
and has closed graph.
Finally, I deﬁne V . Given state s ∈ Si, each agent j’s expected payoﬀ depends on the probability
that agent i’s proposals pass. If i proposes x ∈ A◦(s,θ+), then the proposal must pass in equilib-
rium, and if x / ∈ A(s,θ+), then the proposal must fail. If agent i proposes x ∈ A(s,θ+) \ A◦(s,θ+)
such that Ui(x,s,θ+) ≥ ws ≥ Ui(q,s,θ+) in equilibrium, then the payoﬀ from proposing x must
equal ws, i.e., the probability, say ˆ a, that x is accepted must satisfy
ws = ˆ aUi(x,s,θ+) + (1 − ˆ a)Ui(q,s,θ+),





More generally, when Ui(x,s,θ+) > Ui(q,s,θ+) but ws is unrestricted, deﬁne









which is continuous in (x,s,θ+). Of course, this is not deﬁned when Ui(x,s,θ+) = Ui(q,s,θ+).





{1} if x = q
{ˆ a(x,s,θ+)} if Ui(s)(x,s,θ+) > Ui(s)(q,s,θ+)
[0,1] else,
and note that ˆ A has non-empty, convex values. Moreover, ˆ A has closed graph because ˆ a(x,s,θ+)
is continuous, Ui is continuous, and q is isolated. Given s and θ+, this correspondence gives the
acceptance probabilities, as a function of the outcome proposed in s, that are consistent with the
proposer’s payoﬀ ws in θ+. Then agent j’s continuation value in s is determined by the precise
way that acceptance probabilities depend on proposals, i.e., by a selection from the ˆ A( ,s,θ+)
correspondence. Note that the selection is not necessarily satisfy the conditions for equilibrium
in voting subgames: it is possible, for example, that ˆ a(x,s,θ+) < 1 yet x ∈ A◦(s,θ+). This
discrepancy is repaired after the ﬁxed point argument.
Deﬁne V (s,θ+) to be the set of possible continuation value vectors in state s induced by mea-
surable selections from ˆ A( ,s,θ+) as follows: given each measurable section ˆ a( ,s,θ+), we specify
that the vector v′ = (v′





[ˆ a(x,s,θ+)Uj(x,s,θ+) + (1 − ˆ a(x,s,θ+))Uj(q,s,θ+)]πs(dx), j ∈ N,s ∈ S,
belongs to V (s,θ+). Note ﬁrst that V (s,θ+) is non-empty. Indeed, we obtain a measurable selection
from ˆ A( ,s,θ+) by taking any function constant at 1/2 on the set {x ∈ X | Ui(s)(x,s,θ+) =
17Ui(s)(q,s,θ+)}, a measurable set. Furthermore, since ˆ A( ,s,θ+) is convex-valued, so is V (s,θ+).
That V has closed graph follows from a version of Fatou’s lemma presented in Lemma A.4. Indeed,
to apply that result, let X be the set of outcomes, let Y = S × Θ+, let k = 1, and let Φ = ˆ A. Let
f = (f1,...,fn) be deﬁned by
fi(x,a,y) = aUi(x,s,θ+) + (1 − a)Ui(q,s,θ+)
for all x ∈ X, y = (s,θ+) ∈ Y , and a ∈ [0,1], and let the correspondence F consist of integrals of
f with respect to   = πs. The desired result then follows immediately from the lemma.
These components together deﬁne F, a correspondence with non-empty, convex values and
closed graph. By Glicksberg’s theorem, for each γ ∈ Γ, F( ,γ) has a ﬁxed point θ∗. Furthermore,
the correspondence from parameters γ to the set of ﬁxed points of F( ,γ) has closed graph. The next
lemma establishes a correspondence between ﬁxed points of F( ,γ) and the coalitional bargaining
equilibria in model γ, immediately delivering existence of equilibria and non-empty values of the
correspondence E. Closed graph follows as well, since E(γ) is just the projection of the ﬁxed points
of F( ,γ) onto [0,u]N×S. Then since E has compact range, it is upper hemicontinuous, as required.
Lemma 4.1 For all (w,v,γ) ∈ [0,u]S × [0,u]N×S × Γ, there exists π ∈
 
s∈S P(X(s)) such that
(π,w,v) ∈ F(π,w,v,γ) if and only if there is a coalitional bargaining equilibrium σ∗ = (π∗,α∗)




[α∗(x,s)Ui(s)(x,s;σ∗) + (1 − α∗(x,s))Ui(s)(q,s;σ∗)]π∗
i(s)(s)(dx), s ∈ S.
Let (w,v,γ) be given. I ﬁrst prove the “only if” direction. Consider any π such that (π,w,v)
is a ﬁxed point of F( ,γ). For all i ∈ N and all s ∈ Si, it follows by construction that supp(πs) ⊆
ˆ P(s,θ+), and therefore that f(s,θ+) ≤ g(s,θ+). It then follows that W(s,θ+) = ˆ W(s,θ+). Thus,
for all x ∈ supp(πs), we have Ui(x,s,θ+) ≥ ws ≥ max{ˆ u(s,θ+),Ui(q,s,θ+)}. Then each vj,s is
determined by a selection ˆ a( ,s,θ+) such that acceptance probabilities entail that every proposal x
in the support of πs yields expected payoﬀ ws to the proposer in state s:
ws = ˆ a(x,s,θ+)Ui(x,s,θ+) + (1 − ˆ a(x,s,θ+))Ui(q,s,θ+).
Next, we specify voting strategies α∗ to satisfy the conditions of equilibrium by considering three
diﬀerent types of proposi is indiﬀerent between proposing x or imposing the default. When we deﬁne
equilibrium proposal strategies, below, we correct the inconsistency highlighted here by specifying
that with probability 1 − ˆ a(x,s,θ+), the agent propose q instead of x.
Case 1: In state s ∈ Si, agent i proposes x in A◦(s,θ+). We specify that each agent j accepts





1 if x ∈ A◦
j(s,θ+)
0 else,
which means that x will pass with probability one if proposed, i.e., α∗(x,s) = 1. Note that
it is possible the selection ˆ a( ,s,θ+) actually speciﬁes that x fail with positive probability, i.e.,
18ˆ a(x,s,θ+) < 1. This can create an inconsistency in the calculation of the agents’ continuation
values if πs puts positive probability on such outcomes, but this can occur only under special
conditions. Since x ∈ A◦(s,θ+), we have ˆ u(s,θ+) ≥ Ui(x,s,θ+). But if x ∈ supp(πs), then we have
ˆ u(s,θ+) ≥ Ui(x,s,θ+) ≥ ws ≥ max{ˆ u(s,θ+),Ui(q,s,θ+)} ≥ ˆ u(s,θ+),
which implies Ui(x,s,θ+) = ws. Thus, Ui(x,s,θ+) > Ui(q,s,θ+) would imply ˆ a(x,s,θ+) = 1 by
construction of ˆ A. We conclude that ˆ a(x,s,θ+) < 1 is possible only if Ui(x,s,θ+) ≤ Ui(q,s,θ+),
and we already have the opposite inequality. Thus, the problem described above can only arise if
Ui(x,s,θ+) = Ui(q,s,θ+), i.e., if agent i is indiﬀerent between proposing x or imposing the default.
When I deﬁne equilibrium proposal strategies, below, I correct the inconsistency highlighted here
by specifying that with probability 1 − ˆ a(x,s,θ+), the agent propose q instead of x.
Case 2: In state s ∈ Si, agent i proposes x in A(s,θ+) but not in A◦(s,θ+). We specify
that for each agent j, if x ∈ A◦
j(s,θ+), then j accepts x with probability one; if x / ∈ Aj(s,θ+),
then j rejects x. Then for every coalition C with x ∈ AC(s,θ+), there is some j ∈ C with
Uj(x,s,θ+) = Uj(q,s,θ+). By choosing the vote probabilities of indiﬀerent voters correctly, we can
ensure that the probability x is passes is indeed ˆ a(x,s,θ+). To elaborate, consider any coalition C
such that x ∈ AC(s,θ+), and let C0 = {j ∈ C | Uj(x,s,θ+) = Uj(q,s,θ+)} denote the members of
C indiﬀerent between accepting x and rejection, and let C1 = {j / ∈ C | Uj(x,s,θ+) = Uj(q,s,θ+)}
denote the indiﬀerent agents who do not belong to C. To complete the speciﬁcation of voting
strategies in this case, we specify that each j ∈ C1 reject x with probability one. Now, if all
members of C0 vote to reject x, then it will fail; and if all members of C0 accept x, then it will
pass. Thus, by the intermediate value theorem, there exists c ∈ (0,1) such that if all members of
C0 accept x with probability c, then it passes with probability ˆ a(x,s,θ+). We therefore specify
that α∗
j(x,s) = c for all j ∈ C0, obtaining the desired acceptance probability.
Case 3: In state s, agent i proposes x outside A(s,θ+). Then each agent j accepts x if and
only if x ∈ Aj(s,θ+), which means x fails with probability one, i.e., α∗(x,s) = 0. It is possible
that ˆ a(x,s,θ∗) > 0, but since supp(πs) ⊆ ˆ P(s,θ+), we have πs(A(s,θ+)) = 1, so outcomes outside
A(s,θ+) are never proposed in equilibrium. Thus, the discrepancy does not aﬀect the agents’
continuation values and is not problematic.
To specify proposal strategies, consider any agent i and state s ∈ Si. We stipulate that the
agent mixes according to πs, modiﬁed to correct the discrepancy in Case 1 above. When the agent
is indiﬀerent between imposing the default and proposing an outcome x ∈ A◦(s,θ+) in the support
of πs, we require that the proposer place probability 1 − ˆ a(x,s,θ+) on q, and otherwise, the agent
mixes according to πs. Formally, we deﬁne π∗
i(s) so that for all measurable Y ⊆ X \ {q},
π∗






i (x)({q}) = πs({q}) +
 
Y ∩A◦(s,θ+)
(1 − ˆ a(x,s,θ+))πs(dx).
This maintains the continuation values generated from the ﬁxed point, so v = (vi(s;σ∗))i∈N,s∈S,
and we have Ui(x,s;σ∗) = Ui(x,s;θ+) for all i, x, and s. Moreover, the proposers’ expected payoﬀs
are ws, as in the statement of the lemma.
19To see optimality of π∗
i , we must show that no proposal yields an expected payoﬀ greater than
ws. In Case 1, above, a proposal x passes with probability one, and since x ∈ A◦(s,θ+), we
have ws ≥ ˆ u(s,θ+) ≥ Ui(x,s,θ+), so the expected payoﬀ from proposing x does not exceed ws.
In Case 2, the acceptance probability ˆ a(x,s,θ+) is chosen so that if Ui(x,s,θ+) > Ui(q,s,θ+),
then the expected payoﬀ from proposing x is exactly ws. Indeed, recall that ws ≥ Ui(q,s,θ+). If
Ui(x,s,θ+) > ws ≥ Ui(q,s,θ+), then the expected payoﬀ from proposing x is ws by construction;
and if Ui(x,s,θ+) = Ui(q,s,θ+), then the acceptance probability is unrestricted, but then we have
ws ≥ Ui(q,s,θ+) = Ui(x,s,θ+), so proposing x is not a proﬁtable deviation. In Case 3, proposals
are rejected with probability one, and since ws ≥ Ui(q,s,θ+), no proﬁtable deviation is possible.
Therefore, (π∗,α∗) comprises a coalitional bargaining equilibrium.
For the “if” direction, consider a coalitional bargaining equilibrium σ∗ = (π∗,α∗) with v =
(vi(s;σ∗))i∈N,s∈S and proposer payoﬀs w = (ws)s∈S as in the statement of the lemma. Note by
optimality of proposal strategies, we have ws ≥ Ui(q,s;σ∗) for all i ∈ N and all s ∈ Si. We
modify σ∗ in two ways. First, adjust each α∗
j so that the agent accepts q if it is proposed. Second,
following a proposal of x by agent i such that Ui(x,s;σ∗) > Ui(q,s;σ∗), let the agents mix so that:
(i) x passes with probability one if ws ≥ Ui(x,s), (ii) x fails with probability one if ws = Ui(q,s),
and (iii) if Ui(x,s;σ∗) > ws > Ui(q,s;σ∗), then the proposer’s expected payoﬀ is exactly ws, i.e.,
α∗(x,s)Ui(x,s;σ∗) + (1 − α∗(x,s))Ui(q,s;σ) = ws. The conditions (i)–(iii) necessarily hold for all
x ∈ supp(π∗
i (s)), except perhaps on a set of π∗
i(s)-measure zero, so our modiﬁcations do not aﬀect
the agents’ continuation values. Letting π = (π∗
i (s))i∈N,s∈Si and θ+ = (π,w,v,γ), it follows that
α∗(x,s) ∈ ˆ A(x,s,θ+) for all x and all s, i.e., the acceptance probability α∗( ,s) is a selection from
ˆ A( ,s,θ+), which implies v ∈ V (θ+). Furthermore, we have Ui(x,s;θ+) = Ui(x,s;σ∗) for all i, all
x, and all s, and this implies π ∈ P(θ+), and ﬁnally w ∈ W(θ+). Therefore, (π,w,v) is a ﬁxed
point of F( ,γ), completing the proof.
5 Overview of Proof
To convey the approach to existence, I take the argument of Banks and Duggan (2000) as a start-
ing point. There, a proposer is randomly drawn and a vote held; if the proposal passes, then
the game ends, and otherwise the game continues to the next period and the process is repeated.
Assume for now that stage payoﬀs are strictly positive (so delay is Pareto ineﬃcient) and concave.
The proof of existence in Banks and Duggan (2000) takes the form of a ﬁxed point argument in
the domain of proﬁles of proposal strategies, π = (π1,...,πn). Given a proﬁle π, assuming these
proposal strategies are used in the future and there is no delay (without loss of generality in this
model), each agent’s continuation value is calculated directly: letting pj denote the probability




x ui(x)πj(dx). Given these continuation
values, and assuming that each agent accepts when indiﬀerent (also without loss of generality), we
can calculate for each agent the set Ai(π) of alternatives the agent would accept conditional on
being proposed, and then we specify the set A(π) of alternatives that would pass if proposed. The
equilibrium condition on proposals is that each agent propose a utility-maximizing element of A(π) if
20recognized, engendering a correspondence from the space of mixed proposal strategy proﬁles into
itself, below,







and the existence proof consists in verifying the conditions of Glicksberg’s theorem. Compactness
(in the weak* topology) and convexity of the domain is not problematic. That the correspon-
dence has convex values follows directly from the construction, and a simple continuity argument
establishes that it has closed values.
The crux of the argument is twofold: showing that the correspondence has nonempty values and
that it is upper hemi-continuous. Nonemptiness follows from concavity of stage payoﬀs. Indeed,
letting E[π] denote the mean of the probability measure
 
j∈N pjπj, concavity yields ui(E[π]) ≥
vi(π) for each agent, and therefore E[π] ∈ A(π). In fact, because stage payoﬀs are positive, we
have ui(E[π]) > δivi(π), so each agent would strictly accept this expected outcome if it is proposed.
The proof of upper hemi-continuity follows from an application of the theorem of the maximum.
For this, it is important that the correspondence A(π) is continuous. Upper hemi-continuity of
A(π) is straightforward to verify, but the argument for lower hemi-continuity uses the fact that
the expected value E[π] belongs to the set A◦(π) of proposals that strictly pass; by continuity, the
correspondence A◦(π) has open graph, and concavity implies that A(π) lies in the closure of A◦(π).
Therefore, A(π) is indeed lower hemi-continuous. The approach of Banks and Duggan (2006) is
similar, but instead of assuming a bad status quo, that paper allows for an arbitrary status quo
and imposes a common discount factor to obtain the result.
When concavity is dropped, risk aversion is no longer suﬃcient for nonemptness of A(π). To
address this, we can append a default outcome available to the proposer in case no other proposal
is weakly preferable to delay for a decisive coalition, but the argument for lower hemi-continuity
of A(π) no longer goes through, as illustrated in Figure 1. Here, consider a sequence {πm} of
proposal strategy proﬁles converging to a limit π, with an agent’s discounted continuation value
decreasing along the sequence and her acceptance correspondence expanding discontinuously at
the limit, violating lower hemicontinuity. A single agent’s acceptance set will always be nonempty
(it will contain all utility maximizing outcomes), but this is not necessarily true of coalitional
acceptance sets AC(π), which may be empty along the sequence with coalitionally acceptable
outcomes appearing in the limit—another way of violating lower hemicontinuity. The problem
in these examples is that in the limit, an agent is indiﬀerent between accepting x and rejecting it,
and we have naively speciﬁed that the agent vote to accept when indiﬀerent.
The logic of Ray and Vohra (1999) still relies on lower hemicontinuity of coalitional acceptance
sets in the NTU framework, but the authors obtain this property by assuming strict comprehen-
siveness of the coalitional function V . In their model, once a coalition has formed, the remaining
agents play a “smaller” coalition formation game, continuing until all agents have selected into
(possibly singleton) coalitions. The existence of equilibrium in the game with n agents therefore
requires existence of equilibria in all smaller games, which is assumed in an induction argument.
The argument for the n-player game uses a ﬁxed point argument in which the domain consists
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Figure 1: Lower hemi-continuity problem
bution, γi, over coalitions. Given the rejector-becomes-proposer protocol, this allows the authors
to calculate the value of proposing to each coalition, and then to calculate the expected payoﬀ,
w
j
i, to i when j proposes, assuming: j proposes according to πj, and equilibrium payoﬀs when
i is excluded from the forming coalition are given by induction. The latter is needed, for when
agent i proposes, the agent can eﬀectively determine the next proposer j and can obtain the
payoﬀ w
j
i. Finally, this determines the agent’s optimal payoﬀ as proposer and the set of opti-
mal proposals (either proposing to a coalition or delegating to another agent), as depicted below.

















This correspondence satisﬁes the conditions of Kakutani’s theorem and therefore admits a ﬁxed
point, which corresponds to a stationary equilibrium of the model. Without strict comprehensive-
ness, however, acceptance sets may violate lower hemicontinuity in a way that creates a discontinuity
in the proposer’s optimal payoﬀ to a coalition, as depicted in Figure 2, where agent 1 cannot form
a coalition with agent 2 along the sequence but in the limit can obtain a positive payoﬀ with the
agent.
Clearly, the assumptions of concavity and positive utility play an important role in the argument
of Banks and Duggan (2000), and strict comprehensiveness is critical for the approach of Ray
and Vohra (1999), but none of these conditions are available in the general framework of the
current paper.10 One approach to the problems outlined above is to specify that agents reject
when indiﬀerent, but this creates diﬃculties for upper hemi-continuity of A(π), as can be seen by
modifying the example in Figure 1 so that the agent’s discounted continuation increases (rather
than decreases) to δivi(π). To salvage the ﬁxed point argument, we must specify the votes of
indiﬀerent voters in a more nuanced way. Another possibility is to explicitly include the agents’
10Although stage payoﬀs are normalized to be non-negative, I make no assumption about payoﬀs from the default








Figure 2: Lower hemi-continuity problem
acceptance strategies in the deﬁnition of the correspondence, expanding the domain to include the
vector α = (α1,...,αn) of acceptance strategies. But acceptance decisions are conditioned on the
proposal made, so each αi ∈ {0,1}X lives in a function space, and it is not clear how this space
should be topologized when the set X of outcomes is inﬁnite: the product topology does not give
sequential compactness and is not useful in the current context, and other common topologies would
ﬁx a measure on X and require us to ignore sets of measure zero, a maneuver unavailable here.
The approach in this paper is to circumvent acceptance strategies by means of a Fatou’s lemma
argument, establishing existence of a ﬁxed point and backing voting strategies out in a way consis-
tent with equilibrium. A key insight is that to calculate the agents’ continuation values, it is only
necessary to know their proposal strategies and the probability that any proposed outcome passes
— we do not need the individual acceptance probabilities of the agents. Moreover, although these
acceptance probabilities are conditioned on the outcome proposed and live in a complex, inﬁnite-
dimensional space, they can be reduced to a dimensionality equal to the cardinality of the state
space. Speciﬁcally, if we know the continuation values and the expected payoﬀ to the proposer in
each state, then in a given state we can calculate the proposer’s payoﬀs if the proposal is rejected,
say a, and if the proposal is accepted, say c. Moreover, if the proposer’s expected payoﬀ from
proposing, say b, satisﬁes a < b < c, then the probability that the proposal is accepted must be
b−a
c−a to reconcile proposer payoﬀs with these other quantities. This observation, detailed below,
suggests that given continuation values and proposer payoﬀs, we can suﬃciently pin down voting
strategies to update the agents’ continuation values. In fact, the argument is complicated by the
contingency that the proposer is indiﬀerent between acceptance and rejection, in which case a = c
in the above story, and an acceptance probability is not uniquely pinned down.11 The ﬁxed point
argument therefore involves integration over all selections of acceptance probabilities, and this is
where Fatou’s lemma plays a critical role is proving upper hemicontinuity of the correspondence.
Thus, I expand the domain of the correspondence to include continuation values and proposer
payoﬀs as well as the agents’ mixed proposal strategies, then deduce the existence of a ﬁxed point,
and then back out voting strategies consistent with equilibrium.
To elaborate, return to the setting of Banks and Duggan (2000) but without assuming concavity
or a bad status quo. Suppose that an agent is recognized as proposer, that continuation values are
11This is irrelevant for updating the proposer’s continuation values, but some other agents may not be indiﬀerent,
so the speciﬁcation of acceptance probability is signiﬁcant.
23v = (v1,...,vn), that her expected payoﬀ from proposing is wi, and that she uses a mixed proposal
strategy πi. Consider one play of the coalitional bargaining game induced by v, in which the agents
act as though future payoﬀs were given by these continuation values, and construct the set A(v)
of outcomes that give the members of one or more decisive coalitions a dynamic payoﬀ at least
equal to the dynamic payoﬀ of rejection; these are the proposals that could conceivably pass in an
equilibrium of the induced game. And construct the set A◦(v) of proposals that the members of
a decisive coalition strictly prefer to rejection; these outcomes would surely pass in equilibrium if
proposed. Of course, a proposer can always choose to impose the default. This gives us an upper
















on the expected payoﬀ of the proposer in any equilibrium of the induced game. We refer to the
lower bound as the proposer’s “security value.” Assume:
(i) πi puts probability one on outcomes in A(v) that meet or exceed the agent’s security value,
(ii) wi is greater than or equal to the agent’s security value,
(iii) the payoﬀ of the worst outcome in the support of πi is at least wi.
Then the problem is to specify acceptance probabilities α(x) for every outcome that are consistent
with πi being optimal and with the incentives in voting subgames.
In order that πi is an optimal proposal, it must be that agent i is indiﬀerent over all of the
alternatives in the support of πi: they must all yield an expected payoﬀ of wi. So it suﬃces to
specify acceptance probabilities such that all outcomes in the support of πi yield an expected payoﬀ
of wi, and no outcomes yield a higher payoﬀ. Given an outcome x in the support of πi, suppose







If wi is above agent i’s dynamic payoﬀ from x, then we specify that x passes with probability one,
and if wi is below the payoﬀ from q, we specify that x fails with probability one. Otherwise, wi is













so the probability that x passes when proposed by agent i must be
α(x) =
(1 − δi)wi − ui(q) − δivi
ui(x) − ui(q) − δivi
.
This pins down the probability that x passes when proposed by agent i, unless the proposer is
indiﬀerent between x passing and remaining silent. In that case, the acceptance probability is
24indeterminate. This construction yields a correspondence ˆ Ai( ;v,w): X ⇉ [0,1] of acceptance
probabilities such that for every selection αi from ˆ Ai( ;v,w), the mixed proposal strategy πi is
optimal and yields an expected payoﬀ of wi to agent i from proposing. Importantly, the corre-
spondence ˆ A = ˆ A1 ×     × ˆ An has convex values and closed graph. Note that we are not assured
that the selection of acceptance probabilities is consistent with the equilibrium conditions in voting
subgames, a point to which we return later.
The ﬁxed point correspondence F = P × W × V maps from triples (π,w,v) to product sets
of such triples. We then update the agents’ continuation values as follows: for every agent i and
every selection αi from ˆ Ai, we calculate new continuation values ˆ v = (ˆ v1,..., ˆ vn) by integrating
over proposals with respect to the mixed proposal strategies π = (π1,...,πn), and we collect these
in the set V (π,w,v). This correspondence inherits convex values from ˆ A, and we use a version
of Fatou’s lemma to prove that it has closed graph. To be more explicit, we consider sequences
{(πm,wm,vm)} and {ˆ vm} such that ˆ vm → ˆ v, (πm,wm,vm) → (π,w,v), and ˆ vm ∈ V (πm,wm,vm)
for all m. Each ˆ vm corresponds to some selection αm from the correspondence ˆ A( ;πm,wm,vm).
By assumption, the sequence of updated continuation values converges to ˆ v, but we do not know
whether the sequence {αm} converges—we have not topologized the space of acceptance strategies,
and there is no need to do so. By Lemma A.4, the limiting continuation values ˆ v will indeed
correspond to some selection from A( ;π,w,v), even if the sequence {αm} of selections does not
converge to α in an interesting topology. For the application of the lemma, however, it is critical
that ˆ A have convex values: here, convexity begets closed graph.
The deﬁnitions of the components P and W are less involved, with the updated proposal
strategies taking v as input and updated proposer values taking π and v; this is pictured below,
where θ = (π,w,v). These components are speciﬁed so that they have nonempty, convex values
π w v
α
P(θ) W(θ) V (θ)
and closed graph and so that for every ﬁxed point (π,w,v) of
the correspondence, conditions (i)–(iii) are satisﬁed. Contin-
uation values are generated by a selection from ˆ A( ;v,w) as
described above, but minor adjustments are required, as the
construction does not ensure that this selection will be consis-
tent with the equilibrium conditions in voting subgames. In
particular, it is possible that a proposed outcome x passes with
probability less than one although a decisive coalition of agents
strictly prefer x to rejection, and so it must pass with proba-
bility one in equilibrium. In the proof, we show this can happen only under restrictive conditions,
and we modify the proposal and voting strategies derived from the ﬁxed point argument to correct
this problem. Speciﬁcally, this is only possible if the proposer is indiﬀerent between x and imposing
the default, and so we specify that the agent propose q whenever x would have been proposed and
failed, preserving the agents’ continuation values while satisfying the conditions for equilibrium
6 Concluding Discussion
The main result of this paper establishes existence of coalitional bargaining equilibria, along with
upper hemi-continuity of the equilibrium correspondence, in a general model of bargaining and
25coalition formation. The theorem improves known results by dropping all convexity and compre-
hensiveness: it imposes only a metric space structure on the set of outcomes and assumes only com-
pactness and continuity conditions. As applications, we obtain existence of equilibrium in models
of bargaining over parameters of a game (including issue-by-issue bargaining among committees),
coalition formation in general NTU environments with stochastically determined proposers, and
collective dynamic programming with a metric space of actions and countable state space.
The existence result relies on the assumption that in case a proposal x is rejected in state s,
the transition to next period’s state is governed by p( |q,s), which is independent of the identity
of the agents who reject the proposal. In particular, the order of voting and the identity of the
ﬁrst agent to reject are irrelevant. An alternative protocol of interest in the literature on coalition
formation, but not covered by the current framework, is that in which a proposer makes an oﬀer to
a particular coalition, the oﬀer is considered sequentially by members of that coalition, and the ﬁrst
member to reject (if any) makes a counter-oﬀer. This “rejector-becomes-proposer” protocol presents
especially diﬃcult problems for existence in the general environments considered here. When strict
comprehensiveness is assumed, as in Ray and Vohra (1999), a proposer can make transfers to
break indiﬀerence among coalition members, so we can restrict attention to pure voting strategies,
and the set equilibrium outcomes in a voting subgame is trivially convex. In general, however,
indiﬀerent voters cannot always be induced to accept a proposal, and mixed voting equilibria are
unavoidable. In the proof of Theorem 1, it is important that the agents’ continuation values depend
only on the probability that proposals pass or fail (not on who rejects), and that in any voting
equilibrium, this set of overall acceptance probabilities is convex: if a proposal can pass with some
intermediate probability between zero and one, then it must be that some voters are indiﬀerent
between accepting and rejecting, and we can specify that they mix arbitrarily to convexify the set
of acceptance probabilities.
But when the ﬁrst coalition member to reject becomes the next proposer, the agents’ contin-
uation values depend on who rejects ﬁrst. Given mixed voting strategies of the agents, we must
describe an outcome of the voting game as a probability distribution over the event that the pro-
posal passes and, for each member i, the event that i is the ﬁrst to reject. Here, indiﬀerence cannot
be used to convexify the set of voting outcomes. The problem is illustrated in the ﬁrst panel of
Figure 3, where I consider the possibility that outcome x is proposed to the coalition {1,2}, and
the agents respond in order. If agent 1 is the ﬁrst to reject, then the agent makes a counter oﬀer
and all agents receive their continuation values, an outcome I represent simply by q1. I represent
the outcome that agent 2 is the ﬁrst to reject by q2. Imagine that agent 2 is indiﬀerent between
accepting and rejecting, so the agent may mix arbitrarily in equilibrium; assume agent 1 strictly
prefers to accept if agent 2 will accept, and the agent strictly prefers to reject if agent 2 will reject.
Then there are two pure strategy equilibria, one, (accept,accept), in which the proposal passes,
and one, (reject,reject), in which agent 1 is the ﬁrst to reject.
I claim that the equally weighted convex combination of these distributions cannot be obtained
in any voting equilibrium. If the probability that agent 1 is the ﬁrst to reject is one half, then it
must be that the agent’s vote is determined by a coin toss, as in the second panel of Figure 3; and if
the proposal passes with probability one half, then it must be that agent 2 always accepts. But then
agent 1 has a strict preference to accept, and it is not a best response to mix. Because of this non-















Figure 3: Nonconvex voting equilibrium outcomes
in the proof of Theorem 1 does not go through. The current proof approach can be salvaged
by considering correlated voting equilibria, allowing the members of the coalition to observe a
public randomization device before responding, to obtain convexity of the set of voting outcomes.
This approach, while an extension of the notion of stationary equilibrium used in the bargaining
literature, is a well-known remedy to non-existence of stationary equilibria in stochastic games
and subgame equilibria in general extensive form games; I conjecture that it will yield existence
of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (with correlated voting equilibria) in the coalitional
bargaining model.
A Technical Appendix
Example 1 The unique coalitional bargaining equilibrium discounted continuation value is .7.
Consider any coalitional bargaining equilibrium. I ﬁrst claim that for each agent i, δvi ≥ .7. By
symmetry, we can focus on agent 1, so suppose δv1 < .7. Then agent 1 must accept z when
proposed, and therefore agent 3 proposes z with probability one. It cannot be that agent 2 accepts
x with probability one when proposed by agent 1, for then agent 1 would propose x, and then
δv1 ≥ (.3)[2 + 0 + .7] > .7, a contradiction. Therefore δv2 ≥ .7, and it follows that outcome y
must be realized with positive probability when agent 2 proposes, so agent 3 must accept y with
positive probability, which implies δv3 ≤ .7. On the other hand, it cannot be that agent 3 accepts
y with probability one, for then agent 2 would propose it, and then δv3 ≥ (.3)[0 + .7 + 2] > .7,
a contradiction. Therefore, δv3 = .7. Letting p denote the probability that agent 2 proposes
y or remains silent, we have .7 = δv3 ≥ (.3)[0 + p(.7) + 2], which implies p < .5. Therefore,
the probability that agent 2 proposes x is 1 − p > .5. Since agent 1 accepts x, we then have
δv1 ≥ (.3)[.7 + (.5)(2) + .7] > .7, a contradiction that establishes the claim. Next, I claim that for
each agent i, δvi ≤ .7. Focusing on agent 1, suppose δv1 > .7. Then agent 1 rejects z when it
is proposed, and since the agent’s payoﬀ from remaining silent exceeds the payoﬀ from z, agent 1
does not propose z. Then δv3 < .7, and agent 3 must accept y if it is proposed, so agent 2 proposes
y, and it passes. Furthermore, since agent 3’s payoﬀ from proposing y is .7 > δv3, the agent will
not propose z and will not remain silent. But then δv1 ≤ (.3)[2 + 0 + 0] < .7, a contradiction.  
Two very elementary lemmas follow.
Lemma A.1 Let X be a topological space, let f : X → ℜ be lower semi-continuous, and let g: X →
27ℜ be upper semi-continuous. Deﬁne φ: X ⇉ ℜ by φ(x) = [f(x),g(x)] for all x ∈ X. Then φ has
closed graph.
Proof: Take {(xα,yα)} such that yα ∈ φ(xα) for all α and (xα,yα) → (x,y). Then f(xα) ≤ yα ≤
g(xα) for all α. By assumption, f(x) ≤ liminf f(xα) ≤ y ≤ limsupg(xα) ≤ g(x), so y ∈ φ(x).
Lemma A.2 Let X be a topological space, let φ: X ⇉ [a,b] be a non-empty, convex-valued corre-
spondence with closed graph and compact range. Then there exist f : X → ℜ and g: X → ℜ such
that f is lower semi-continuous, g is upper semi-continuous, and for all x ∈ X, φ(x) = [f(x),g(x)].
Proof: By Aliprantis and Border’s (2006) Lemma 17.30, the function g(x) := maxφ(x) is upper
semi-continuous. Similarly, h(x) := max{−c | c ∈ φ(x)} is upper semi-continuous, which implies
that f(x) := −h(x) = minφ(x) is lower semi-continuous, as required.
The next lemma extends an interval-valued correspondence with closed graph from a compact
subset of a metric space to the entire metric space.
Lemma A.3 Let X be a metric space, let Y be a non-empty, compact subset of X. Let φ: Y ⇉
[a,b] be a non-empty, convex-valued correspondence with closed graph and compact range. Then
there exists Φ: X ⇉ [a,b] such that Φ has non-empty, convex values, has closed graph, and extends
φ, i.e., for all y ∈ Y , Φ(y) = φ(y).
Proof: The proof is constructive. Let f and g be as in the statement of Lemma A.2. For all x ∈ X,




where d, our metric, is continuous. By the theorem of the maximum, M is upper hemi-continuous









is upper semi-continuous, so
f∗(x) := −h(x) = min
y∈M(x)
f(y)
is lower semi-continuous. Deﬁne Φ(x) = [f∗(x),g∗(x)] for all x ∈ X. This correspondence clearly
has non-empty, convex values, and it has closed graph by Lemma A.1.
28The ﬁnal lemma extends the version of Fatou’s lemma on upper hemi-continuity of integrals of
correspondences due to Aumann (1976) and Yannelis (1990). For a simpliﬁed statement of their
result, let X and Y be metric spaces, with X compact, let (X,Σ, ) be a measure space with Σ
the completion of the Borel σ-algebra, and let F : X × Y ⇉ ℜk have nonempty values and closed
graph. Let
 
F(x,y) (dx) consist of all integrals of measurable selections from F( ,y). Then the
correspondence of integrals,
 
F(x, ) (dx): Y ⇉ ℜk, has closed graph. For our arguments, we
need to allow the probability measure   to vary, and as a consequence we add the assumption of
convex values. A technical extension, which is useful in the application of this paper, is that I
consider integrals of selections from F( ,y) composed with a continuous function f(x,φ(x),y) that
is linear in its second argument.
Lemma A.4 Let X and Y be metric spaces, and assume X is compact. Let Φ: X × Y ⇉ [0,1]k
be a correspondence with non-empty, convex values and closed graph. Let f : X × [0,1] × Y → ℜn
be continuous, and assume that for all x ∈ X and all y ∈ Y , f(x,a,y) is aﬃne linear in a ∈ [0,1]k.




f(x,φ(x),y) (dx) | φ is a Borel mble selection from Φ( ,y)
 
for all (y, ) ∈ Y × P(X) has closed graph.
Proof: Consider a sequence {( m,ym,cm)} in P(X) × Y × [0,1]k such that cm ∈ F(ym, m) for
all m and such that ( m,ym,cm) → ( ,y,c). Thus, for each m, there exists a measurable selection





Let X and A denote the Borel sigma-algebras on X and [0,1]k, respectively, and let S denote the
Borel sigma-algebra on X × [0,1]. Note that S = X ⊗ A. (See Aliprantis and Border’s (2006)
Theorem 4.44.) Deﬁne the probability measure νm on (X × [0,1]k,S) as follows: given Borel
measurable S ∈ S, let
νm(S) =  m({x ∈ X | (x,φm(x)) ∈ S}).






Furthermore, since X × [0,1]k is compact, {νm} must have a weak* convergent subsequence (still
indexed by m for simplicity) with limit, say, ν. Since Φ has closed graph and the support of a
probability measure varies lower hemicontinuously in the weak* topology, we have
supp(ν) ⊆ limsupsupp(νm) ⊆ limsupgraph(Φ( ,ym)) ⊆ graph(Φ( ,y)).
29Using continuity of f, Billingsley’s (1968) Theorem 5.5 implies that







Note that the marginal of νm on X is just  m, and by Billingsley’s (1968) Theorem 3.1, νm → ν
weak* implies that the marginals of νm also converge weak* to the marginal of ν. Thus, the
marginal of ν on X is in fact  .
Fixing y, deﬁne the random variable ξ on the probability space (X×[0,1]k,S,ν) by ξ(x,a) = x,
and deﬁne the random variable α on (X × [0,1]k,S,ν) by α(x,a) = a. Let T = {{Z} × [0,1]k |
Z ∈ X} be the sigma-algebra of events conditioning on information about x. By Dudley’s (2002)
Theorem 10.2.2, there exists a conditional distribution for α given T , Pα|T : A×X ×[0,1]k → [0,1]
such that (i) there exists T ∈ T such that ν(T) = 0 and for all (x,a) ∈ (X ×[0,1])\T, Pα|T ( ,x,a)
is a probability measure on A, and (ii) for all A ∈ A, Pα|T (A, ) is a version of the probability of
A, conditional on T , and is T -measurable, i.e., constant in a. Then, by Dudley’s (2002) Theorem
10.2.1, conditional distributions {Px | x ∈ X} exist for ν, i.e., for all A ∈ A, all Z ∈ X, all
(x,a) ∈ X × [0,1]k, and all T ∈ T ,
(a) Px is a probability measure on ([0,1]k,A),
(b) ν(Z × A) =
 
Z Px(A) (dx),
(c) x  → Px(A) is X-measurable.










If g: X × [0,1]k → ℜn and each component gi is integrable, then the latter observation extends
straightforwardly.
Since X × [0,1]k is compact and f is continuous, each component fi is integrable. As a conse-














[0,1]k aPx(da) is Borel measurable, and where the second equality relies on linearity










and it follows that for  -almost every x, Px(Φ(x,y)) = 1. Since Φ(x,y) is convex, we have
E[a|x] ∈ Φ(x,y). We can then construct φ by splicing E[a| ] with an arbitrary measurable selec-
tion on the measure zero set such that E[a|x] / ∈ Φ(x,y) without aﬀecting the value of the integral
30 





and therefore c ∈ F(y, ), as required.
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